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Abstract
The classical approach for repairing a Description Logic ontology
O in the sense of removing an unwanted consequence α is to delete
a minimal number of axioms from O such that the resulting ontology
O′ does not have the consequence α. However, the complete deletion
of axioms may be too rough, in the sense that it may also remove
consequences that are actually wanted. To alleviate this problem, we
propose a more gentle way of repair in which axioms are not necessarily
deleted, but only weakened. On the one hand, we investigate general
properties of this gentle repair method. On the other hand, we propose
and analyze concrete approaches for weakening axioms expressed in the
Description Logic EL.
1 Introduction
Description logics (DLs) [2, 5] are a family of logic-based knowledge represen-
tation formalisms, which are employed in various application domains, such
as natural language processing, configuration, databases, and bio-medical
ontologies, but their most notable success so far is the adoption of the DL-
based language OWL1 as standard ontology language for the Semantic Web.
As the size of DL-based ontologies grows, tools that support improving the
quality of such ontologies become more important. DL reasoners2 can be
used to detect inconsistencies and to infer other implicit consequences, such
1see https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/ for its most recent edition OWL2.
2see http://owl.cs.manchester.ac.uk/tools/list-of-reasoners/
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as subsumption and instance relationships. However, for the developer of a
DL-based ontology, it is often quite hard to understand why a consequence
computed by the reasoner actually follows from the knowledge base, and how
to repair the ontology in case this consequence is not intended.
Axiom pinpointing [22] was introduced to help developers or users of DL-
based ontologies understand the reasons why a certain consequence holds
by computing so-called justifications, i.e., minimal subsets of the ontology
that have the consequence in question. Black-box approaches for computing
justifications such as [23, 14, 8] use repeated calls of existing highly-optimized
DL reasoners for this purpose, but it may be necessary to call the reasoner
an exponential number of times. In contrast, glass-box approaches such as
[3, 22, 20, 18] compute all justifications by a single run of a modified, but
usually less efficient reasoner.
Given all justifications of an unwanted consequence, one can then re-
pair the ontology by removing one axiom from each justification. However,
removing complete axioms may also eliminate consequences that are actu-
ally wanted. For example, assume that our ontology contains the following
terminological axioms:
Prof ⊑ ∃employed .Uni ⊓ ∃enrolled .Uni ,
∃enrolled .Uni ⊑ Studi .
These two axioms are a justification for the incorrect consequence that profes-
sors are students. While the first axiom is the culprit, removing it completely
would also remove the correct consequence that professors are employed by a
university. Thus, it would be more appropriate to replace the first axiom by
the weaker axiom Prof ⊑ ∃employed .Uni . This is the basic idea underlying
our gentle repair approach. In general, in this approach we weaken one axiom
from each justification such that the modified justifications no longer have
the consequence.
Approaches for repairing ontologies while keeping more consequences than
the classical approach based on completely removing axioms have already
been considered in the literature. On the one hand, there are approaches
that first modify the given ontology, and then repair this modified ontology
using the classical approach. In [13], a specific syntactic structural transfor-
mation is applied to the axioms in an ontology, which replaces them by sets of
logically weaker axioms. More recently, the authors of [11] have generalized
this idea by allowing for different specifications of the structural transforma-
tion of axioms. They also introduce a specific structural transformation that
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is based on specializing left-hand sides and generalizing right-hand sides of
axioms in a way that ensures finiteness of the obtained set of axioms. Closer
to our gentle repair approach is the one in [16], which adapts the tracing
technique from [4] to identify not only the axioms that cause a consequence,
but also the parts of these axioms that are actively involved in deriving the
consequence. This provides them with information for how to weaken these
axioms. In [24], repairs are computed by weakening axioms with the help
of refinement operators that were originally introduced for the purpose of
concept learning [17].
In this paper, we will introduce a general framework for repairing on-
tologies based on axiom weakening. This framework is independent of the
concrete method employed for weakening axioms and of the concrete ontol-
ogy language used to write axiom. It only assumes that ontologies are finite
sets of axioms, that there is a monotonic consequence operator defining which
axiom follows from which, and that weaker axioms have less consequences.
However, all our examples will consider ontologies expressed in the light-
weight DL EL. Our first important result is that, in general, the gentle
repair approach needs to be iterated, i.e., applying it once does not necessar-
ily remove the consequence. This problem has actually been overlooked in
[16], which means that their approach does not always yield a repair. Our
second result is that at most exponentially many iterations are always suffi-
cient to reach a repair. The authors of [24] had already realized that iteration
is needed, but they did not give an example explicitly demonstrating this,
and they had no termination proof. Instead of allowing for arbitrary ways
of weakening axioms, we then introduce the notion of a weakening relation,
which restricts the way in which axioms can be weakened. Subsequently, we
define conditions on such weakening relations that equip the gentle repair
approach with better algorithmic properties if they are satisfied. Finally, we
address the task of defining specific weakening relations for the DL EL. After
showing that two quite large such relations do not behave well, we introduce
two restricted relations, which are based on generalizing the right-hand sides
of axioms semantically or syntactically. Both of them satisfy most of our con-
ditions, but from a complexity point of view the syntactic variant behaves
considerably better.
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2 Basic definitions
In the first part of this section, we introduce basic notions from DLs to
provide us with concrete examples for how ontologies and their axioms may
look like. In the second part, we provide basic definitions regarding the
repair of ontologies, which are independent of the ontology language these
ontologies are written in. However, the concrete examples given there are
drawn from DL-based ontologies.
2.1 Description Logics
A wide range of DLs of different expressive power haven been investigated
in the literature. Here, we only introduce the DL EL, for which reasoning is
tractable [9].
Let NC and NR be mutually disjoint sets of concept and role names,
respectively. Then EL concepts over these names are constructed through
the grammar rule
C ::= A | ⊤ | C ⊓ C | ∃r.C,
where A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR, i.e., the DL EL has the concept constructors ⊤
(top concept), ⊓ (conjunction), and ∃r.C (existential restriction). The size
of an EL concept C is the number of occurrences of ⊤ as well as concept
and role names in C, and its role depth is the maximal nesting of existential
restrictions. If S is a finite set of EL concepts, then we denote the conjunction
of these concepts as
d
S.
Knowledge is represented using appropriate axioms formulated using con-
cepts, role names and an additional set of individual names NI . An EL axiom
is either a GCI of the form C ⊑ D with C,D concepts, or an assertion,
which is of the form C(a) (concept assertion) or r(a, b) (role assertion), with
a, b ∈ NI , r ∈ NR, and C a concept. A finite set of GCIs is called a TBox ; a
finite set of assertions is an ABox. An ontology is a finite set of axioms.
The semantics of EL is defined using interpretations I = (∆I , ·I), where
∆I is a non-empty set, called the domain, and ·I is the interpretation func-
tion, which maps every a ∈ NI to an element a
I ∈ ∆I , every A ∈ NC to a set
AI ⊆ ∆I , and every r ∈ NR to a binary relation r
I ⊆ ∆I×∆I . The interpre-
tation function ·I is extended to arbitrary EL concepts by setting ⊤I := ∆I ,
(C ⊓D)I := CI ∩DI , and (∃r.C)I := {δ ∈ ∆I | ∃η ∈ CI .(δ, η) ∈ rI}.
The interpretation I satisfies the GCI C ⊑ D if CI ⊆ DI ; it satisfies the
assertion C(a) and r(a, b), if aI ∈ CI and (aI , bI) ∈ rI , respectively. It is a
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model of the TBox T , the ABox A, and the ontology O, if it satisfies all the
axioms in T , A, and O, respectively. Given an ontology O, and an axiom
α, we say that α is a consequence of O (or that O entails α) if every model
of O satisfies α. In this case, we write O |= α. The set of all consequences
of O is denoted by Con(O). As shown in [9], consequences in EL can be
decided in polynomial time. We say that the two axioms γ, δ are equivalent
if Con({γ}) = Con({δ}).
A tautology is an axiom α such that ∅ |= α, where ∅ is the ontology that
contains no axioms. For example, GCIs of the form C ⊑ ⊤ and C ⊑ C, and
assertions of the form ⊤(a) are tautologies. We write C ⊑∅ D to indicate that
the GCI C ⊑ D is a tautology. In this case we say that C is subsumed by D.
We say that the concepts C,D are equivalent (written C ≡∅ D) if C ⊑∅ D
and D ⊑∅ C; and that C is strictly subsumed by D (written C ⊏∅ D) if
C ⊑∅ D and C 6≡∅ D.
The following recursive characterization of the subsumption relation ⊑∅
has been proved in [6].
Lemma 1. Let C,D be two EL concepts such that
C = A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Ak ⊓ ∃r1.C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ∃rm.Cm
D = B1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Bℓ ⊓ ∃s1.D1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ∃sn.Dn,
and A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . , Bℓ ∈ NC. Then C ⊑
∅ D iff {B1, . . . , Bℓ} ⊆ {A1, . . . , Ak}
and for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, there exists an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, such that ri = sj
and Ci ⊑
∅ Dj.
2.2 Repairing Ontologies
For the purpose of this subsection and also large parts of the rest of this paper,
we leave it open what sort of axioms and ontologies are allowed in general,
but we draw our examples from EL ontologies. We only assume that there is
a monotonic consequence relation O |= α between ontologies (i.e., finite sets
of axioms) and axioms, and that Con(O) consists of all consequences of O.
Assume in the following that the ontology O = Os ∪ Or is the disjoint
union of a static ontology Os and a refutable ontology Or. When repairing
the ontology, only the refutable part may be changed. For example, the
static part of the ontology could be a carefully hand-crafted TBox whereas
the refutable part is an ABox that is automatically generated from (possibly
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erroneous) data. It may also make sense to classify parts of a TBox as
refutable, for example if the TBox is obtained as a combination of ontologies
from different sources, some of which may be less trustworthy than others.
In a privacy application [10, 1], it may be the case that parts of the ontology
are publicly known whereas other parts are hidden. In this setting, in order
to hide critical information, it only makes sense to change the hidden part
of the ontology.
Definition 2. Let O = Os ∪Or be an ontology consisting of a static and a
refutable part, and α an axiom such that O |= α and Os 6|= α. The ontology
O′ is a repair of O w.r.t. α if
Con(Os ∪O
′) ⊆ Con(O) \ {α}.
The repair O′ is an optimal repair of O w.r.t. α if there is no repair O′′ of
O w.r.t. α with Con(Os ∪O
′) ⊂ Con(Os ∪O
′′). The repair O′ is a classical
repair of O w.r.t. α if O′ ⊂ Or, and it is an optimal classical repair of O
w.r.t. α if there is no classical repair O′′ of O w.r.t. α such that O′ ⊂ O′′.
The condition Os 6|= α ensures that O does have a repair w.r.t. α since
obviously the empty ontology ∅ is such a repair. In general, optimal repairs
need not exist.
Proposition 3. There is an EL ontology O = Os ∪Or and an EL axiom α
such that O does not have an optimal repair w.r.t. α.
Proof. We set α := A(a), Os := T , and Or := A where
T := {A ⊑ ∃r.A, ∃r.A ⊑ A} and A := {A(a)}.
To show that there is no optimal repair ofO w.r.t. α, we consider an arbitrary
repair O′ and show that it cannot be optimal. Thus, let O′ be such that
Con(T ∪O′) ⊆ Con(O) \ {A(a)}.
Without loss of generality we assume that O′ contains assertions only. In
fact, if O′ contains a GCI that does not follow from T , then Con(T ∪O′) 6⊆
Con(O). This is an easy consequence of the fact that, in EL, a GCI follows
from a TBox together with an ABox iff it follows from the TBox alone. It is
also easy to see thatO′ cannot contain role assertions since no such assertions
are entailed by O. In addition, concept assertions following from T ∪O′ must
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have a specific form.
Claim: If the assertion C(a) is in Con(T ∪O′), then C does not contain A.
Proof of claim. By induction on the role depth n of C.
Base case: If n = 0 and A is contained in C, then A is a conjunct of C
and thus C(a) ∈ Con(T ∪ O′) implies A(a) ∈ Con(T ∪ O′), which is a
contradiction.
Step case: If n > 0 and A occurs at role depth n in C, then C(a) ∈ Con(T ∪
O′) implies that there are roles r1, . . . , rn such that (∃r1. · · · ∃rn.A)(a) ∈
Con(T ∪O′). Since Con(T ∪O′) ⊆ Con(O), this can only be the case if r1 =
. . . = rn = r since O clearly has models in which all roles different from r are
empty. Since T contains the GCI ∃r.A ⊑ A and rn = r, (∃r1. · · · ∃rn.A)(a) ∈
Con(T ∪ O′) implies (∃r1. · · · ∃rn−1.A)(a) ∈ Con(T ∪ O
′). Induction now
yields that this is not possible, which completes the proof of the claim.
Furthermore, as argued in the proof of the claim, any assertion belonging
to Con(O) cannot contain roles other than r. The same is true for concept
names different from A. Consequently, all assertions C(a) ∈ Con(T ∪O′) are
such that C is built using r and ⊤ only. Any such concept C is equivalent
to a concept of the form (∃r.)n⊤.
Since O′ is finite, there is a maximal n0 such that ((∃r.)
n0⊤)(a) ∈ O′,
but ((∃r.)n⊤)(a) 6∈ O′ for all n > n0. Since (∃r.)
n⊤ ⊑ (∃r.)m⊤ if m ≤ n, we
can assume without loss of generality that O′ = {((∃r.)n0⊤)(a)}. We claim
that ((∃r.)n⊤)(a) 6∈ Con(T ∪ O′) if n > n0. To this purpose, we construct
a model I of T ∪ O′ such that aI 6∈ ((∃r.)n⊤)I . This model is defined as
follows:
∆I = {d0, d1, . . . , dn0},
rI = {(di−1, di) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n0},
AI = ∅,
aI = d0.
Clearly, I is a model of O′, and it does not satisfy ((∃r.)n⊤)(a) if n > n0. In
addition, it is a model of T since AI = (∃r.A)I = ∅.
Consequently, if we choose n such that n > n0 and defineO
′′ := {((∃r.)n⊤)(a)},
then Con(T ∪O′) ⊂ Con(T ∪O′′). In addition, Con(T ∪O′′) ⊆ Con(O) \
{A(a)}, i.e., O′′ is a repair. This shows that O′ is not optimal. Since we
have chosen O′ to be an arbitrary repair, this shows that there cannot be an
optimal repair.
In contrast, optimal classical
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computing such a repair uses justifications and hitting sets [21].
Definition 4. Let O = Os ∪Or be an ontology and α an axiom such that
O |= α and Os 6|= α. A justification for α in O is a minimal subset J of
Or such that Os ∪ J |= α. Given justifications J1, . . . , Jk for α in O, a
hitting set of these justifications is a set H of axioms such that H ∩ Ji 6= ∅
for i = 1, . . . , k. This hitting set is minimal if there is no other hitting set
strictly contained in it.
Note that the condition Os 6|= α implies that justifications are non-empty.
Consequently, hitting sets and thus minimal hitting sets always exist.
The algorithm for computing an optimal classical repair of O w.r.t. α
proceeds in two steps: (i) compute all justifications J1, . . . , Jk for α in O;
and then (ii) compute a minimal hitting set H of J1, . . . , Jk and remove the
elements of H from Or, i.e., output O
′ = Or \H .
It is not hard to see that, independently of the choice of the hitting set,
this algorithm produces an optimal classical repair. Conversely, all optimal
classical repairs can be generated this way by going through all hitting sets.
3 Gentle Repairs
Instead of removing axioms completely, as in the case of a classical repair, a
gentle repair replaces them by weaker axioms.
Definition 5. Let β, γ be two axioms. We say that γ is weaker than β if
Con({γ}) ⊂ Con({β}).
Alternatively, we could have introduced weaker w.r.t the strict part of
the ontology, by requiring Con(Os ∪ {γ}) ⊂ Con(Os ∪ {β}).
3 In this paper,
we will not consider this alternative definition, although most of the results
in this section would also hold w.r.t. it (e.g., Theorem 7). The difference
between the two definitions is, however, relevant in the next section, where
we consider concrete approaches for how to weaken axioms. In the case where
the whole ontology is refutable, there is of course no difference between the
two definitions.
Obviously, the weaker-than relation from Definition 5 is transitive, i.e., if
α is weaker than β and β is weaker than γ, then α is also weaker than γ. In
3Defining weaker w.r.t the whole ontology O does not make sense since this ontology
is possibly erroneous.
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addition, a tautology is always weaker than a non-tautology. Replacing an
axiom by a tautology is obviously the same as removing this axiom. We as-
sume in the following that there exist tautological axioms, which is obviously
true for description logics such as EL.
Gentle repair algorithm: we still compute all justifications J1, . . . , Jk for
α in O and a minimal hitting set H of J1, . . . , Jk. But instead of removing
the elements of H from Or, we replace them by weaker axioms. To be more
precise, if β ∈ H and Ji1 , . . . , Jiℓ are all the justifications containing β, then
replace β by a weaker axiom γ such that
Os ∪ (Jij \ {β}) ∪ {γ} 6|= α for j = 1, . . . , ℓ. (1)
Note that such a weaker axiom γ always exists. In fact, we can choose a
tautology as the axiom γ. If γ is a tautology, then replacing β by γ is the
same as removing β. Thus, we have Os ∪ (Jij \ {β}) ∪ {γ} 6|= α due to the
minimality of Jij . In addition, minimality of Jij also implies that β is not a
tautology since otherwise Os ∪ (Jij \ {β}) would also have the consequence
α. In general, different choices of γ yield different runs of the algorithm.
In principle, the algorithm could always use a tautology γ, but then this
run would produce a classical repair. To obtain more gentle repairs, the
algorithm needs to use a strategy that chooses stronger axioms (i.e., axioms
γ that are less weak than tautologies) if possible. In contrast to what is
claimed in the literature (e.g. [16]), this approach does not necessarily yield
a repair.
Lemma 6. Let O′ be the ontology obtained from Or by replacing all the
elements of the hitting set by weaker ones such that the condition (1) is
satisfied. Then Con(Os ∪ O
′) ⊆ Con(O), but in general we may still have
α ∈ Con(Os ∪O
′).
Proof. The definition of “weaker than” (see Definition 5) obviously implies
that Con(Os ∪O
′) ⊆ Con(O).
We now give an example where this approach nevertheless does not pro-
duce a repair. Let O = Os ∪ Or where Os = ∅ and Or = T ∪ A with
T = {B ⊑ A} and A = {(A⊓B)(a)}, and α be the consequence A(a). Then
α has a single justification J = {(A⊓B)(a)}, and thus H = {β = (A⊓B)(a)}
is the only hitting set. The assertion γ = B(a) is weaker than β and it sat-
isfies (J \ {β})∪ {γ} 6|= α. However, if we define O′ = (O \ {β})∪ {γ}, then
O′ |= α still holds.
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A similar example that uses only GCIs is the following, where now we
consider a refutable ontology O = Or = {C ⊑ A ⊓ B,B ⊑ A} and we
assume that α is the consequence C ⊑ A. Then α has a single justification
J = {C ⊑ A ⊓ B} and thus H = {β = C ⊑ A ⊓ B} is the only hitting set.
The GCI γ = C ⊑ B is a weaker than β and it satisfies (J \ {β})∪ {γ} 6|= α.
However, if we define O′ = (O \ {β}) ∪ {γ}, then O′ |= α.
These examples show that applying the gentle repair approach only once
may not lead to a repair. For this reason, we need to iterate this approach,
i.e., if the resulting ontology Os ∪O
′ still has α as a consequence, we again
compute all justifications and a hitting set for them, and then replace the
elements of the hitting set with weaker axioms as described above. This is
iterated until a repair is reached. We can show that this iteration indeed
always terminates after finitely many steps with a repair.
Theorem 7. Let O(0) = O
(0)
s ∪ O
(0)
r be a finite ontology and α an axiom
such that O(0) |= α and O
(0)
s 6|= α. Applied to O(0) and α, the iterative
algorithm described above stops after a finite number of iterations that is at
most exponential in the cardinality of O
(0)
r , and yields as output an ontology
that is a repair of O
(0)
s w.r.t. the consequence α.
Proof. Assume that O
(0)
r contains n axioms, and that there is an infinite run
R of the algorithm on input O(0) and α. Take a bijection ℓ0 between O
(0)
r
and {1, . . . , n} that assigns unique labels to axioms. Whenever we weaken
an axiom during a step of the run, the new weaker axiom inherits the label
of the original axiom. Thus, we have bijections ℓi : O
(i)
r → {1, . . . , n} for all
ontologies O
(i)
r considered during the run R of the algorithm. For i ≥ 0 we
define
Si := {K ⊆ {1, . . . , n} |
Os ∪ {β ∈ O
(i)
r | ℓi(β) ∈ K} |= α},
i.e., Si contains all sets of indices such that the corresponding subset of O
(i)
r
together with Os has the consequence α.
We claim that Si+1 ⊂ Si. Note that Si+1 ⊆ Si is an immediate conse-
quence of the fact that ℓi(γ) = j = ℓi+1(γ
′) implies that γ = γ′ or γ′ is weaker
than γ. Thus, it remains to show that the inclusion is strict. This follows
from the following observations. Since the algorithm does not terminate with
the ontology O
(i)
r , we still have Os ∪O
(i)
r |= α, and thus there is at least one
justification ∅ ⊂ J ⊆ O
(i)
r . Consequently, the hitting set H used in this
step of the algorithm contains an element β of O
(i)
r . When going from O
(i)
r to
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O
(i+1)
r , β is replaced by a weaker axiom β ′ such that Os∪(J \{β})∪{β
′} 6|= α.
But then the set {ℓ(γ) | γ ∈ J} belongs to Si, but not to Si+1.
Since S0 contains only exponentially many sets, the strict inclusion Si+1 ⊂
Si can happen only exponentially often, which contradicts our assumption
that there is an infinite run R of the algorithm on input O(0) and α. This
shows termination after exponentially many steps. However, if the algorithm
terminates with output O
(i)
r , then Os ∪ O
(i)
r 6|= α. In fact, otherwise, there
would be a possibility to weaken O
(i)
r into O
(i+1)
r since it would always be
possible to replace the elements of a hitting set by tautologies, i.e., perform
a classical repair.
When computing a classical repair, considering all justifications and then
removing a minimal hitting set of these justifications guarantees that one
immediately obtains a repair. We have seen in the proof of Lemma 6 that
with our gentle repair approach this need not be the case. Nevertheless, we
were able to show that, after a finite number of iterations of the approach,
we obtain a repair. The proof of termination actually shows that for this it is
sufficient to weaken only one axiom of one justification such that the resulting
set is no longer a justification. This motivates the following modification of
our approach:
Modified gentle repair algorithm: compute one justification J for α in
O and choose an axiom β ∈ J . Replace β by a weaker axiom γ such that
Os ∪ (J \ {β}) ∪ {γ} 6|= α. (2)
Clearly, one needs to iterate this approach, but it is easy to see that the
termination argument used in the proof of Proposition 7 also applies here.
Corollary 8. Let O(0) = O
(0)
s ∪O
(0)
r be a finite ontology and α an axiom such
that O(0) |= α and O
(0)
s 6|= α. Applied to O(0) and α, the modified iterative
algorithm stops after a finite number of iterations that is at most exponential
in the cardinality of O
(0)
r , and yields as output an ontology Ôs that is a repair
of O
(0)
s w.r.t. α.
An important advantage of this modified approach is that the complexity
of a single iteration step may decrease considerably. For example, for the
DL EL, a single justification can be computed in polynomial time, while
computing all justifications may take exponential time [7]. In addition, to
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compute a minimal hitting set one needs to solve an NP-complete problem
[12] whereas choosing one axiom from a single justification is easy. However,
as usual, there is no free lunch: we can show that the modified gentle repair
algorithm may indeed need exponentially many iteration steps.4
Proposition 9. There is a sequence of EL ontologies O(n) = O(n)s ∪O
(n)
r with
O
(n)
s = ∅ and an EL axiom α such that the modified gentle repair algorithm
applied to O(n) and α has a run with exponentially many iterations in the
size of O(n).
Proof. For n ≥ 1, consider the set of concept names I(n) = {Pi, Qi | 1 ≤ i ≤
n}, and define O(n) := O
(n)
r := T
(n)
1 ∪ T
(n)
2 , where
T
(n)
1 := {A ⊑ ∃r.
d
I(n), ∃r.(Pn ⊓Qn) ⊑ B} ∪
{Pi ⊓Qi ⊑ Pi+1, Pi ⊓Qi ⊑ Qi+1 | 1 ≤ i < n},
T (n)2 := {∃r.(X ⊓ Y ) ⊑ DXY , DXY ⊓X ⊑ Y |
X ∈ {Pi, Qi}, Y ∈ {Pi+1, Qi+1}, 1 ≤ i < n} ∪
{∃r.P1 ⊑ P1, ∃r.Q1 ⊑ Q1, Pn ⊑ B, Qn ⊑ B}.
It is easy to see that the size of O(n) is polynomial in n and that O(n) |= A ⊑
B. Suppose that we want to get rid of this consequence using the modified
gentle repair approach. First, we can find the justification
{A ⊑ ∃r.
l
I(n), ∃r.(Pn ⊓Qn) ⊑ B}.
We repair it by weakening the first axiom to
γ := A ⊑ ∃r.
l
(I(n) \ {Pn}) ⊓ ∃r.
l
(I(n) \ {Qn}).
At this point, we can find a justification that uses γ and Pn−1 ⊓Qn−1 ⊑ Pn.
We further weaken γ to
A ⊑ ∃r.
d
(I(n) \ {Pn, Pn−1}) ⊓
∃r.
d
(I(n) \ {Pn, Qn−1}) ⊓ ∃r.
d
(I(n) \ {Qn}).
Repeating this approach, after 2n weakenings we have only changed the first
axiom, weakening it to the axiom
A ⊑
l
Xi∈{Pi,Qi},1≤i≤n
∃r.(X1 ⊓ · · · ⊓Xn), (3)
4It is not clear yet whether this is also the case for the unmodified gentle repair algo-
rithm.
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whose right-hand side is a conjunction with 2n conjuncts, each of them rep-
resenting a possible choice of Pi or Qi at every location i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
So far, we have just considered axioms from T
(n)
1 . Taking also axioms
from T
(n)
2 into account, we obtain for every conjunct ∃r.(X1 ⊓ · · · ⊓ Xn) in
axiom (3) a justification for A ⊑ B that consists of (3) and the axioms
{ ∃r.X1 ⊑ X1, Xn ⊑ B } ∪
{ ∃r.(Xi ⊓Xi+1) ⊑ DXiXi+1, DXiXi+1 ⊓Xi ⊑ Xi+1 | 1 ≤ i < n }.
This justification can be removed by weakening (3) further by deleting one
concept name appearing in the conjunct. The justifications for other con-
juncts are not influenced by this modification. Thus, we can repeat this for
each of the exponentially many conjuncts, which shows that overall we have
exponentially many iterations of the modified gentle repair algorithm in this
run.
3.1 Weakening Relations
In order to obtain better bounds on the number of iterations of our algo-
rithms, we restrict the way in which axioms can be weakened. Before in-
troducing concrete approaches for how to do this for EL axioms in the next
section, we investigate such restricted weakening relations in a more abstract
setting.
Definition 10. Given a pre-order ≻ (i.e., an irreflexive and transitive binary
relation) on axioms, we say that it
• is a weakening relation if β ≻ γ implies that Con({γ}) ⊂ Con({β});
• is bounded (linear, polynomial) if, for every axiom α, there is a (linear,
polynomial) bound b(α) on the length of all ≻-chains issuing from α;
• is complete if, for any axiom β that is not a tautology, there is a tau-
tology γ such that β ≻ γ.
If we use a linear (polynomial) and complete weakening relation, then
termination with a repair is guaranteed after a linear (polynomial) number
of iterations.
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Proposition 11. Let ≻ be a linear (polynomial) and complete weakening
relation. If in the above (modified) gentle repair algorithm we have β ≻ γ
whenever β is replaced by γ, then the algorithm stops after a linear (polyno-
mial) number of iterations and yields as output an ontology that is a repair
of O = Os ∪Or w.r.t. the consequence α.
Proof. For every axiom β in Or we consider the length of the longest ≻-
chain issuing from it, and then sum up these numbers over all axioms in
Or. The resulting number is linearly (polynomially) bounded by the size of
the ontology (assuming that this size is given as sum of the sizes of all its
axioms). Let us call this number the chain-size of the ontology. Obviously,
if β is replaced by β ′ with β ≻ β ′, then the length of the longest ≻-chain
issuing from β ′ is smaller than the length of the longest ≻-chain issuing from
β. Consequently, if O
(i+1)
r is obtained from O
(i)
r in the i-th iteration of the
algorithm, then the chain-size of O
(i)
r is strictly larger than the chain-size
of O
(i+1)
r . This implies that there can be only linearly (polynomially) many
iterations.
Consider a terminating run of the algorithm that has produced the se-
quence of ontologies Or = O
(0)
r ,O
(1)
r , . . . ,O
(n)
r . Then we have
Con(Os ∪Or) ⊇ Con(Os ∪O
(1)
r ) ⊇ . . . ⊇ Con(Os ∪O
(n)
r )
since ≻ is a weakening relation. If the algorithm has terminated due to the
fact that α 6∈ Con(Os∪O
(n)
r ), then O
(n)
r is a repair of O w.r.t. α. Otherwise,
the only reason for termination could be that, although α ∈ Con(Os∪O
(n)
r ),
the algorithm cannot generate a new ontology O
(n+1)
r . In the unmodified
gentle repair approach this means that there is an axiom β in the hitting setH
such that there is no axiom γ with β ≻ γ such that (1) is satisfied. However,
using a tautology as the axiom γ actually allows us to satisfy the condition
(1). Thus, completeness of ≻ implies that this reason for termination without
success cannot occur. An analogous argument can be used for the modified
gentle repair approach.
When describing our (modified) gentle repair algorithm, we have said that
the chosen axiom β needs to be replaced by a weaker axiom γ such that (1)
or (2) holds. But we have not said how such an axiom γ can be found. This
of course depends on which ontology language and which weakening relation
is used. In the abstract setting of this section, we assume that an “oracle”
provides us with a weaker axiom.
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Definition 12. Let ≻ be a weakening relation. An oracle for ≻ is a com-
putable function W that, given an axiom β that is not ≻-minimal, provides
us with an axiom W (β) such that β ≻ W (β). For ≻-minimal axioms β we
assume that W (β) = β.
If the weakening relation is complete and well-founded (i.e., there are no
infinite descending ≻-chains β1 ≻ β2 ≻ β2 ≻ · · · ), we can effectively find an
axiom γ such that (1) or (2) holds. We show this formally only for (2), but
condition (1) can be treated similarly.
Lemma 13. Assume that J is a justification for the consequence α, and
β ∈ J . If ≻ is a well-founded and complete weakening relation and W is an
oracle for ≻, then there is an n ≥ 1 such that (2) holds for γ =W n(β). If ≻
is additionally linear (polynomial), then n is linear (polynomial) in the size
of β.
Proof. Well-foundedness implies that the ≻-chain β ≻W (β) ≻W (W (β)) ≻
. . . is finite, and thus there is an n such that W n+1(β) = W n(β), i.e., W n(β)
is ≻-minimal. Since ≻ is complete, this implies that W n(β) is a tautology.
Minimality of the justification J then yields Os ∪ (J \ {β})∪ {W
n(β)} 6|= α.
Linearity (polynomiality) of ≻ ensures that the length of the ≻-chain β ≻
W (β) ≻ W (W (β)) ≻ . . . is linearly (polynomially) bounded by the size of
β.
Thus, to find an axiom γ satisfying (1) or (2), we iteratively apply W
to β until an axiom satisfying the required property is found. The proof
of Lemma 13 shows that at the latest this is the case when a tautology is
reached, but of course the property may already be satisfied before that by
a non-tautological axiom W i(β).
In order to weaken axioms as gently as possible, W should realize small
weakening steps. The smallest such step is one where there is no step in
between.
Definition 14. Let ≻ be a pre-order. The one-step relation5 induced by ≻
is defined as
≻1 := {(β, γ) ∈ ≻ | there is no δ such that β ≻ δ ≻ γ}.
We say that ≻1 covers ≻ if its transitive closure is again ≻, i.e., ≻
+
1 = ≻. In
this case we also say that ≻ is one-step generated.
5This is sometimes also called the transitive reduction of ≻.
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If ≻ is one-step generated, then every weaker element can be reached by
a finite sequence of one-step weakenings, i.e., if β ≻ γ, then there are finitely
many elements δ0, . . . , δn (n ≥ 1) such that β = δ0 ≻1 δ1 ≻1 . . . ≻1 δn = γ.
This leads us to the following characterization of pre-orders that are not
one-step generated.
Lemma 15. The pre-order ≻ is not one-step generated iff there exist two
comparable elements β ≻ γ such that every finite chain β = δ0 ≻ δ1 ≻ . . . ≻
δn = γ can be refined in the sense that there is an i, 0 ≤ i < n, and an
element δ such that δi ≻ δ ≻ δi+1.
If β ≻ γ are such that any finite chain between them can be refined, then
obviously there cannot be an upper bound on the length of the chains issuing
from β. Thus, Lemma 15 implies the following result.
Proposition 16. If ≻ is bounded, then it is one-step generated.
The following example shows that well-founded pre-orders need not be
one-step generated.
Example 17. Consider the pre-order ≻ on the set
P := {β} ∪ {δi | i ≥ 0},
where β ≻ δi for all i ≥ 0, and δi ≻ δj iff i > j. It is easy to see that ≻ is
well-founded and that ≻1 = {(δi+1, δi) | i ≥ 0}. Consequently, ≻1
+ contains
none of the tuples (β, δi) for i ≥ 0, which shows that ≻1 does not cover ≻.
In particular, any finite chain between β and δi can be refined.
Interestingly, if we add elements γi (i ≥ 0) with β ≻ γi ≻ δi to this
pre-order, then it becomes one-step generated.
One-step generated weakening relations allow us to find maximally strong
weakenings satisfying (1) or (2). Again, we consider only condition (2), but
all definitions and results can be adapted to deal with (1) as well.
Definition 18. Let J be a justification for the consequence α, and β ∈ J . We
say that γ is amaximally strong weakening of β in J ifOs∪(J\{β})∪{γ} 6|= α,
but Os ∪ (J \ {β}) ∪ {δ} |= α for all δ with β ≻ δ ≻ γ.
In general, maximally strong weakenings need not exist. As an example,
assume that the pre-order introduced in Example 17 (without the added
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axioms γi) is a weakening relation on axioms, and assume that J = {β} and
that none of the axioms δi have the consequence. Obviously, in this situation
there is no maximally strong weakening of α in J .
Next, we introduce conditions under which maximally strong weakenings
always exist, and can also be computed. We say that the one-step generated
weakening relation ≻ is effectively finitely branching if for every axiom β the
set {γ | β ≻1 γ} is finite and can effectively be computed.
Proposition 19. Let ≻ be a well-founded, one-step generated, and effec-
tively finitely branching weakening relation and assume that the consequence
relation |= is decidable. Then all maximally strong weakenings of an axiom
in a justification can effectively be computed.
Proof. Let J be a justification for the consequence α, and β ∈ J . Since ≻
is well-founded, one-step generated, and finitely branching, König’s Lemma
implies that there are only finitely many γ such that β ≻ γ, and all these
γ can be reached by following ≻1. Thus, by a breadth-first search, we can
compute the set of all γ such that there is a path β ≻1 δ1 ≻1 . . . ≻1 δn ≻1 γ
with Os∪(J\{β})∪{γ} 6|= α, but Os∪(J\{β})∪{δi} |= α for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If this set still contains elements that are comparable w.r.t. ≻ (i.e., there is
a ≻1-path between them), then we remove the weaker elements. It is easy to
see that the remaining set consists of all maximally strong weakenings of β
in J .
Note that the additional removal of weaker elements in the above proof
is really necessary. In fact, assume that β ≻1 δ1 ≻1 γ and β ≻1 δ2 ≻1
γ, and that Os ∪ (J \ {β}) ∪ {γ} 6|= α, Os ∪ (J \ {β}) ∪ {δ1} |= α, but
Os ∪ (J \ {β}) ∪ {δ2} 6|= α. Then both δ2 and γ belong to the set computed
in the breadth-first search, but only δ2 is a maximally strong weakening (see
Example 29, where it is shown that this situation can really occur when
repairing EL ontologies).
In particular, this also means that iterated application of a one-step or-
acle, i.e., an oracle W satisfying β ≻1 W (β), does not necessarily yield a
maximally strong weakening.
4 Weakening Relations for EL Axioms
In this section, we restrict the attention to ontologies written in EL, but
some of our approaches and results could also be transferred to other DLs.
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We start with observing that weakening relations for EL axioms need not be
one-step generated.
Proposition 20. If we define β ≻g γ if Con(γ) ⊂ Con(β), then ≻g is a
weakening relation on EL axioms that is not one-step generated.
Proof. It is obvious that≻g is a weakening relation.6 To see that it is not one-
step generated, consider a GCI β that is not a tautology and an arbitrary
tautology γ. Then we have β ≻ γ. Let β = δ0 ≻
g δ1 ≻
g . . . ≻g δn = γ
be a finite chain leading from β to γ. Then δn−1 must be a GCI that is
not a tautology. Assume that δn−1 = C ⊑ D. Then δ := ∃r.C ⊑ ∃r.D
satisfies δn−1 ≻
g δ ≻g γ. By Lemma 15, this shows that ≻ is not one-step
generated.
Our main idea for obtaining more well-behaved weakening relations is
to weaken a GCI C ⊑ D by generalizing the right-hand side D and/or by
specializing the left-hand side C. Similarly, a concept assertion D(a) can be
weakened by generalizing D. For role assertions we can use as weakening an
arbitrary tautological axiom, but will no longer consider them explicitly in
the following.
Proposition 21. If we define
C ⊑ D ≻s C ′ ⊑ D′ if C ′ ⊑∅ C, D ⊑∅ D′ and {C ′ ⊑ D′} 6|= C ⊑ D,
D(a) ≻s D′(a) if D ⊏∅ D′,
then ≻s is a complete weakening relation.
Proof. To prove that ≻s is a weakening relation we must show that β ≻s γ
implies Con({γ}) ⊂ Con({β}). If C ′ ⊑∅ C and D ⊑∅ D′ hold, then it follows
that Con({C ′ ⊑ D′}) ⊆ Con({C ⊑ D}) and Con({a : D′}) ⊆ Con({a : D}).
The second inclusion is strict iff D ⊏∅ D′. For the first inclusion to be strict,
C ′ ⊏∅ C or D ⊏∅ D′ is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. This is
why we explicitly require {C ′ ⊑ D′} 6|= C ⊑ D, which yields strictness of the
inclusion. Completeness is trivial due to the availability of all tautologies of
the form C ⊑ ⊤ and ⊤(a).
To see why, e.g., D ⊏∅ D′ does not imply Con({C ⊑ D′}) ⊂ Con({C ⊑
D}), notice that A ⊓ ∃r.A ⊏∅ ∃r.A, but Con({A ⊑ ∃r.A}) = Con({A ⊑
A ⊓ ∃r.A}).
6In fact, it is the greatest one w.r.t. set inclusion.
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Unfortunately, the weakening relation ≻s introduced in Proposition 21
is not well-founded since left-hand sides can be specialized indefinitely. For
example, we have ⊤ ⊑ A ≻s ∃r.⊤ ⊑ A ≻s ∃r.∃r.⊤ ⊑ A ≻s · · · . To avoid this
problem, we now restrict the attention to sub-relations of ≻s that only gen-
eralize the right-hand sides of GCIs. We will not consider concept assertions,
but they can be treated similarly.
4.1 Generalizing the Right-Hand Sides of GCIs
We define
C ⊑ D ≻sub C ′ ⊑ D′ if C ′ = C and C ⊑ D ≻s C ′ ⊑ D′.
Theorem 22. The relation ≻sub on EL axiom is a well-founded, complete,
and one-step generated weakening relation, but it is not polynomial.
Proof. Proposition 21 implies that ≻sub is a weakening relation and com-
pleteness follows from the fact that C ⊑ D ≻sub C ⊑ ⊤ whenever C ⊑ D is
not a tautology. In EL, the inverse subsumption relation is well-founded, i.e.,
there cannot be an infinite sequence C0 ⊏
∅ C1 ⊏
∅ C2 ⊏
∅ . . . of EL concepts.
Looking at the proof of this result given in [6], one sees that it actually shows
that ⊏∅ is bounded. Obviously, this implies that ≻sub is bounded as well,
and thus one-step generated by Proposition 16.
It remains to show that ≻sub is not polynomial. Let n ≥ 1 and Nn :=
{A1, . . . , A2n} be a set of 2n distinct concept names. Then we have
∃r.
l
Nn ⊏
∅
l
X⊆Nn∧|X|=n
∃r.
l
X.
Note that the size of ∃r.
d
Nn is linear in n, but that the conjunction on
the right-hand side of this strict subsumption consists of exponentially many
concepts ∃r.
d
X that are incomparable w.r.t. subsumption. Consequently, by
removing one conjunct at a time, we can generate an ascending chain w.r.t.
⊏
∅ of EL concepts whose length is exponential in n. Using these concepts as
right-hand sides of GCIs with left-hand side B for a concept name B 6∈ Nn,
we obtain an exponentially long descending chain w.r.t. ≻sub .
To be able to apply Proposition 19, it remains to show that ≻sub is effec-
tively finitely branching. For this purpose, we first investigate the one-step
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relation ⊏∅1 induced by ⊏
∅. Given an EL concept C, we want to characterize
the set of its upper neighbors
Upper(C) := {D | C ⊏∅1 D},
and show that it can be computed in polynomial time.
In a first step, we reduce the concept C by exhaustively replacing sub-
concepts of the form E ⊓ F with E ⊑∅ F by E (modulo associativity and
commutativity of ⊓). As shown in [15], this can be done in polynomial time,
and two concepts C,D are equivalent (i.e., C ≡∅ D) iff their reduced forms
are equal up to associativity and commutativity of ⊓.
Definition 23. Given a reduced EL concept C, we define the set U(C) by
induction on the role depths of C. More precisely, U(C) consists of the
concepts D that can be obtained from C as follows:
• Remove a concept name A from the top-level conjunction of C.
• Remove an existential restriction ∃r.E from the top-level conjunction
of C, and replace it by the conjunction of all existential restrictions
∃r.F for F ∈ U(E).
For example, if C = A⊓∃r.(B1 ⊓B2 ⊓B3), then U(C) consists of the two
concepts ∃r.(B1⊓B2⊓B3) and A⊓∃r.(B1⊓B2)⊓∃r.(B1⊓B3)⊓∃r.(B2⊓B3).
We want to prove that Upper(C) = U(C). Obviously, this shows that
Upper(C) can be computed in time polynomial in the size of C. But first we
we need to show some technical lemmas.
Lemma 24. Let C be reduced and assume that D ∈ U(C). Then C ⊏∅ D.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the role depths of C. If D is
obtained from C by removing a concept name from the top-level conjunction
of C, then C ⊏∅ D is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1.
Thus, assume that D is obtained from C by replacing an existential re-
striction ∃r.E from the top-level conjunction of C with the conjunction of all
existential restrictions ∃r.F for F ∈ U(E). Then induction yields E ⊏∅ F
for all F ∈ U(E). Thus, C ⊑∅ D is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1.
Now, assume that D ⊑∅ C. By Lemma 1 this implies that there is an exis-
tential restriction ∃r.D′ in the top-level conjunction of D such that D′ ⊑∅ E.
Obviously, D′ 6∈ U(E) since in that case we would have E ⊏∅ D′. Thus, ∃r.D′
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is an existential restriction different from ∃r.E from the top-level conjunction
of C. But then D′ ⊑∅ E contradicts our assumption that C is reduced. Thus,
we have shown C ⊏∅ D also in this case.
Lemma 25. Let C be reduced and assume that C ⊏∅ D. Then there is
D′ ∈ U(C) such that D′ ⊑∅ D.
Proof. Again, we prove the lemma by induction on the role depths of C. Let
C = A1⊓. . .⊓Ak⊓∃r1.C1⊓. . .⊓∃rm.Cm and D = B1⊓. . .⊓Bℓ⊓∃s1.D1⊓. . .⊓
∃sn.Dn for concept names A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . Bℓ. Since C ⊑
∅ D, we know by
Lemma 1 that {B1, . . . , Bℓ} ⊆ {A1, . . . , Ak} and that for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
there is i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that ri = sj and Ci ⊑
∅ Dj .
Strictness of the subsumption relationship C ⊏∅ D may be due to the
fact that {B1, . . . , Bℓ} ⊂ {A1, . . . , Ak}. In this case, let A ∈ {A1, . . . , Ak} \
{B1, . . . , Bℓ}, and let D
′ be obtained from C by removing the concept name
A from the top-level conjunction of C. Then D′ ∈ U(C), and D′ ⊑∅ D holds
by Lemma 1.
Now assume that {B1, . . . , Bℓ} = {A1, . . . , Ak}. Then D 6⊑
∅ C implies
that there is an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n with ri = sj
we have Dj 6⊑
∅ Ci. Let D
′ be obtained from C by replacing the existential
restriction ∃ri.Ci from the top-level conjunction of C with the conjunction
of all existential restrictions ∃ri.F for F ∈ U(Ci). Then D
′ ∈ U(C) and it
remains to prove that D′ ⊑∅ D.
To show that the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied, we consider an
existential restriction ∃sj .Dj in the top-level conjunction ofD. Since C ⊑
∅ D,
there is an index ν, 1 ≤ ν ≤ m such that rν = sj and Cν ⊑
∅ Dj . If ν 6= i,
then ∃rν .Cν is also a top-level conjunct of D
′, and thus we are done. Thus,
assume that ν = i. In this case, we know that Dj 6⊑
∅ Cν = Ci, and thus
Cν ⊏
∅ Dj. By induction, there is a concept F ∈ U(Ci) such that F ⊑
∅ Dj ,
and we are again done since ∃ri.F is a top-level conjunct of D
′.
Lemma 26. Let C be a reduced EL concept. If D and D′ are different
elements of U(C), then D 6⊑∅ D′.
Proof. IfD andD′ are obtained from C by removing different concept names,
then D ⊑∅ D′ obviously cannot hold by Lemma 1. The same is true if D
is obtained by removing a concept name and D′ is obtained by replacing an
existential restriction.
Assume that D is obtained from C by replacing an existential restriction
∃r.E with the conjunction of the existential restrictions ∃r.F for F ∈ U(E).
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Since D,D′ are different elements of U(C), ∃r.E still belongs to the top-
level conjunction of D′. Now, D ⊑∅ D′ implies that there is an existential
restriction ∃r.E ′ in the top-level conjunction ofD such that E ′ ⊑∅ E. If ∃r.E ′
is an original conjunct in the top-level conjunction of C, this contradicts
our assumption that C is reduced. Otherwise, ∃r.E ′ must be such that
E ′ ∈ U(G) for an existential restriction ∃r.G different from ∃r.E in the top-
level conjunction of C. But then G ⊏∅ E ′ ⊑∅ E, which again contradicts our
assumption that C is reduced.
Proposition 27. Let C be a reduced EL concept. Then up to equivalence
we have Upper(C) = U(C). In particular, this implies that the cardinality of
Upper(C) is polynomial in the size of C and that this set can be computed in
polynomial time in the size of C.
Proof. First, assume that D ∈ Upper(C), i.e., C ⊏∅1 D. Then Lemma 25
implies that there is D′ ∈ U(C) such that D′ ⊑∅ D. But then C ⊏∅ D′ ⊑∅ D
and C ⊏∅1 D imply D
′ ≡∅ D, and thus D is equivalent to an element of U(C).
Conversely, assume that D ∈ U(C). Then Lemma 24 yields C ⊏∅ D.
To show that C ⊏∅1 D, assume to the contrary that there is a concept D
′
such that C ⊏∅ D′ ⊏∅ D. Then Lemma 25 yields the existence of a concept
D′′ ∈ U(C) such that C ⊏∅ D′′ ⊑∅ D′ ⊏∅ D. But then D and D′′ are two
different elements of U(C) that are comparable w.r.t. ⊏∅, which contradicts
Lemma 26.
The polynomiality results for U(C) can easily be shown by induction on
the role depth of C.
Unfortunately, this result does not transfer immediately from concept
subsumption to axiom weakening. In fact, as we have seen before, strict sub-
sumption need not produce a weaker axiom (see the remark below Propo-
sition 21). Thus, to find all GCIs C ⊑ D′ with C ⊑ D ≻sub1 C ⊑ D
′, it is
not sufficient to consider only concepts D′ with D ⊏∅1 D
′. In case C ⊑ D′ is
equivalent to C ⊑ D, we need to consider upper neighbors of D′, etc.
Proposition 28. The one-step relation ≻sub1 induced by ≻
sub is effectively
finitely branching.
Proof. Since ⊏∅ is one-step generated, finitely branching, and well-founded,
for a given concept D, there are only finitely many concepts D′ such that
D ⊏∅ D′. Thus, a breadth first search along ⊏∅1 can be used to compute all
concepts D′ such that there is a path D ⊏∅1 D1 ⊏
∅
1 . . .Dn ⊏
∅
1 D
′ where C ⊑ D
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⊤ ⊑ A ⊓ ∃r.A
⊤ ⊑ A ⊓ ∃r.⊤ ⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A
⊤ ⊑ ∃r.⊤
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6|=
|=
6|=
|=6|=
Figure 1: One-step weakening
is equivalent to C ⊑ Di for i = 1, . . . , n, and C ⊑ D ≻
sub C ⊑ D′. Since ⊏∅
is one-step generated, it is easy to see that all axioms γ with C ⊑ D ≻sub1 γ
can be obtained this way. However, the computed set of axioms may contain
elements that are not one-step successors of C ⊑ D. Thus, in a final step,
we remove all axioms that are weaker than some axiom in the set.
Example 29. To see that the final step of removing axioms in the proof of
Proposition 28 is needed, consider the axiom β = ⊤ ⊑ A⊓∃r.A in Fig. 1. The
right-hand side A⊓∃r.A has two upper neighbors, namely ∃r.A and A⊓∃r.⊤.
The first yields the axiom ⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A, which satisfies ⊤ ⊑ A ⊓ ∃r.A ≻sub1
⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A. The second yields the axiom ⊤ ⊑ A⊓∃r.⊤, which is equivalent to
β. Thus, the only upper neighbor ⊤ ⊑ ∃r.⊤ is considered, but this concept
yields an axiom that is actually weaker than ⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A, and thus needs to be
removed.
A similar, but simpler example can be used to show that the additional
removal of weaker elements in the proof of Proposition 19 is needed. Let α
be the consequence ⊤ ⊑ A, J = {β} for β := ⊤ ⊑ A ⊓ B, δ1 := ⊤ ⊑ A,
δ2 := ⊤ ⊑ B, and γ := ⊤ ⊑ ⊤. Then we have exactly the situation described
below the proof of Proposition 19, with ≻sub as the employed weakening
relation.
Corollary 30. All maximally strong weakenings w.r.t. ≻sub of an axiom in
a justification can effectively be computed.
Proof. By Proposition 19, this is an immediate consequence of the fact that
≻sub is well-founded, one-step generated, and effectively finitely branching.
4 WEAKENING RELATIONS FOR EL AXIOMS 24
The algorithm for computing maximally strong weakenings described in
the proof of Proposition 19 has non-elementary complexity for ≻sub . In fact,
the bound for the depth of the tree that must be searched grows by one
exponential for every increase in the role-depth of the concept on the right-
hand side. It is not clear how to obtain an algorithm with a better complexity.
Example 40 below yields an exponential lower-bound, which still leaves a
huge gap. We can also show that even deciding whether a given axiom is a
maximally strong weakening w.r.t. ≻sub is coNP-hard.
Before we can prove this hardness result, we must introduce the coNP-
complete problem that will be used in our proof by reduction. A monotone
Boolean formula ϕ is built from propositional variables using the connectives
conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨) only. If V is the set of propositional
variables occurring in ϕ, then propositional valuations can be seen as subsets
W of V . Since ϕ is monotone, the valuation V clearly satisfies ϕ, and the
valuation ∅ falsifies ϕ. We are now interested in maximal valuations falsifying
ϕ, where valuations are compared using set inclusion.
Definition 31. The all-maximal-valuations problem receives as input
• a monotone Boolean formula ϕ with propositional variables V , and
• a set V of maximal valuations falsifying ϕ.
The question is then whether V is the set of all maximal valuations falsifying
ϕ.
As shown in [19] (Lemma 6.13), the all-maximal-valuations problem is
coNP-complete.
Proposition 32. The problem of deciding whether a given EL GCI C ⊑ D′
is a maximally strong weakening of the EL GCI C ⊑ D w.r.t. ≻sub is coNP-
hard.
Proof. Given an instance ϕ,V of the all-maximal-valuations problem, we
construct an instance of our problem as follows. For every subformula ψ of
ϕ, we introduce a new concept name Bψ. If ψ is not a propositional variable,
we define the TBox:
Tψ :=
{
{Bψ1 ⊓Bψ2 ⊑ Bψ} ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2,
{Bψ1 ⊑ Bψ, Bψ2 ⊑ Bψ} ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
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Let V be the set of all propositional variables appearing in ϕ, and let csub(ϕ)
be the set of all subformulas of ϕ that are not in V .
We construct the ontology that has only one refutable axiom
A ⊑ ∃r.
l
{Bp | p ∈ V },
and as static part the ontology
Ts =
⋃
ψ∈csub(ϕ)
Tψ ∪ {∃r.Bϕ ⊑ C}.
Clearly, the refutable axiom is a justification for A ⊑ C.
Given a set W of valuations, define the concept
XW :=
l
W∈W
∃r.
l
{Bp | p ∈ W}.
It follows that {A ⊑ XW} ∪ Ts 6|= A ⊑ C iff no valuation in W satisfies ϕ.
We claim that V is the set of all maximal valuations not satisfying ϕ iff
A ⊑ XV is a maximally strong weakening of A ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V }.
First, assume that V is the set of all maximal valuations not satisfying
ϕ. Then {A ⊑ XV} ∪ Ts 6|= A ⊑ C and clearly A ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V } ≻
sub
A ⊑ XV . If A ⊑ XV is not maximally strong, then there is a concept E
such that ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V } ⊏
∅ E ⊏∅ XV and {A ⊑ E} ∪ Ts 6|= A ⊑
C. The strict subsumption relationships imply the E contains a top-level
conjunct ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ U} for a set U ⊆ V such that U is incomparable
w.r.t. set inclusion with all the sets in V. Since V is the set of all maximal
valuations not satisfying ϕ, this implies that U satisfies ϕ. Consequently,
{A ⊑ E}∪Ts |= A ⊑ C, which yields a contradiction to our assumption that
A ⊑ XV is not maximally strong.
Conversely, assume that V is not the set of all maximal valuations not
satisfying ϕ, i.e., there is a maximal valuation U not satisfying ϕ such that
U 6∈ V. This implies that U is incomparable w.r.t. inclusion with any of the
elements of V, and thus ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V } ⊏
∅ XV∪{U} ⊏
∅ XV . In addition,
we know that {A ⊑ XV∪{U}} ∪ Ts 6|= A ⊑ C, which shows that A ⊑ XV is
not maximally strong.
4.2 Syntactic Generalization
In order to obtain a weakening relation that has better algorithmic properties
than ≻sub , we consider a syntactic approach for generalizing EL concepts.
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Basically, the concept D is a syntactic generalization of the concept C if D
can be obtained from C by removing occurrences of subconcepts. To ensure
that such a removal really generalizes the concept, we work here with reduced
concepts.
Definition 33. Let C,D be EL concepts. Then D is a syntactic generaliza-
tion of C (written C ⊏syn D) if it is obtained from the reduced form of C by
replacing some occurrences of subconcepts 6= ⊤ with ⊤.
For example, the concept C = A1⊓∃r.(A1⊓A2) is already in reduced form,
and its syntactic generalizations include, among others, ⊤⊓∃r.(A1 ⊓A2) ≡
∅
∃r.(A1 ⊓ A2), A1 ⊓ ∃r.(⊤ ⊓ A2) ≡
∅ A1 ⊓ ∃r.A2, ∃r.⊤, and ⊤.
Lemma 34. If C ⊏syn D, then C ⊏∅ D, and the length of any ⊏syn-chain
issuing from C is linearly bounded by the size of C.
Proof. We use a modified definition of size (called m-size) where only occur-
rences of concept and role names are counted. Reducing a concept preserves
equivalence and never increases the m-size. Since the concept constructors
of EL are monotonic, C ⊏syn D implies C ⊑∅ D. In addition, the m-size of
the reduced form of C is strictly larger than the m-size of the reduced form
of D since concepts 6= ⊤ have an m-size > 0 whereas ⊤ has m-size 0. This
shows C 6≡∅ D (and thus C ⊏∅ D), since these reduced forms then cannot
be equal up to associativity and commutativity of ⊓. In addition, it clearly
yields the desired linear bound on the length of ⊏syn -chains.
By Proposition 16, this linear bound implies that ⊏syn is one-step gener-
ated. In the corresponding one-step relation ⊏syn1 , the replacements can be
restricted to subconcepts that are concept names or existential restriction of
the form ∃r.⊤. For example, we have (modulo equivalence)
∃r.(A1 ⊓ A2 ⊓A3) ⊏
syn
1 ∃r.(A1 ⊓ A2) ⊏
syn
1 ∃r.A2 ⊏
syn
1 ∃r.⊤ ⊏
syn
1 ⊤.
However, not all such restricted replacements lead to single steps w.r.t. ⊏syn .
For example, consider the concept C = ∃r.(A1 ⊓ A2) ⊓ ∃r.(A2 ⊓ A3). Then
replacing A3 by ⊤ leads to D = ∃r.(A1 ⊓ A2) ⊓ ∃r.(A2 ⊓ ⊤) ≡ ∃r.(A1 ⊓ A2),
but we have C ⊏syn ∃r.(A1 ⊓A2) ⊓ ∃r.A3 ⊏
syn D.
Before proving that every ⊏syn1 -step can be realized by such restricted
replacements, we use the fact that any EL concept can be written as a con-
junction of concept names and existential restrictions to give a recursive char-
acterization of ⊏syn . Let C be an EL concept, and assume that its reduced
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form is
C ′ = A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Ak ⊓ ∃r1.C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ∃rℓ.Cℓ.
Then we have Ai 6= Aj for all i 6= j in {1, . . . , k} and rµ 6= rν or Cµ 6⊑
∅
Cν for all ν 6= µ in {1, . . . , ℓ}, since otherwise C
′ would not be reduced.
Replacing some occurrences of subconcepts with ⊤ then corresponds (modulo
equivalence) to
• removing some of the conjuncts of the form Ai,
• removing some of the conjuncts of the form ∃rµ.Cµ,
• replacing some of the conjuncts of the form ∃rν .Cν with a conjunct of
the form ∃rν .Dν where Cν ⊏
syn Dν
such that at least one of these actions is really taken. Thus, C ⊏syn1 D implies
that D can be obtained from the reduced form of C by taking exactly one of
these actions for exactly one conjunct. In fact, either taking several actions
has the same effect as taking one of them, or taking the actions one after
another leads to a sequence of several strict syntactic generalizations steps,
which is precluded by the definition of ⊏syn1 .
Lemma 35. Let C 6≡∅ ⊤ with reduced form C ′ = A1⊓ . . .⊓Ak⊓∃r1.C1⊓ . . .⊓
∃rℓ.Cℓ, and assume that C ⊏
syn
1 D. Then D is obtained (modulo equivalence)
from C ′ by either
1. removing exactly one of the concept names Ai,
2. removing exactly one of the existential restrictions ∃rµ.Cµ for Cµ ≡
∅ ⊤,
or
3. replacing exactly one of the existential restrictions ∃rν .Cν with ∃rν .Dν
for Cν ⊏
syn
1 Dν.
Proof. As argued above, C ⊏syn1 D implies that D is obtained from C
′ by
performing one of the following three actions:
• Removing exactly one of the conjuncts of the form Ai: in this case, we
are done.
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• Removing exactly one of the conjuncts of the form ∃rµ.Cµ: in this case
we are done if Cµ ≡
∅ ⊤. Thus, assume that Cµ 6≡
∅ ⊤. Let D′ be
obtained from C ′ by replacing ∃rµ.Cµ with ∃rµ.⊤. Then we either
have C ⊏syn D′ ⊏syn D or D′ ≡∅ D. The first case contradicts our
assumption that C ⊏syn1 D. The second case is dealt with below since
Cµ ⊏
syn ⊤.
• Replacing exactly one of the conjuncts of the form ∃rν .Cν with a con-
junct of the form ∃rν .Dν where Cν ⊏
syn Dν: in this case we are done
if Cν ⊏
syn
1 Dν . Thus, assume that there is an EL concept D
′
ν such that
Cν ⊏
syn D′ν ⊏
syn Dν . Since we already know that ⊏
syn is one-step
generated, we can assume without loss of generality that Cν ⊏
syn
1 D
′
ν .
Let D′ be obtained from C ′ by replacing ∃rν .Cν with ∃rµ.D
′
ν . Then we
either have C ⊏syn D′ ⊏syn D or D′ ≡∅ D. The first case contradicts
our assumption that C ⊏syn1 D. In the second case, we are done.
Since there are no other cases, this completes the proof of the lemma.
Based on this lemma, the following proposition can now easily be shown
by induction on the role depth of C.
Proposition 36. Let C be an EL concept and C ′ its reduced form. If C ⊏syn1
D, then D can be obtained (modulo equivalence) from C ′ by either replacing
a concept name or a subconcept of the form ∃r.⊤ by ⊤.
As an immediate consequence we obtain that ⊏syn is effectively linearly
branching.
Corollary 37. For a given EL concept C, the set {D | C ⊏syn1 D} has a
cardinality that is linear in the size of C and it can be computed in polynomial
time.
Proof. That the cardinality of {D | C ⊏syn1 D} is linearly bounded by the
size of C is an immediate consequence of Proposition 36. To compute the
set, one first computes all concepts that can be obtained by replacing in the
reduced form of C a concept name or a subconcept of the form ∃r.⊤ by ⊤.
The polynomially many concepts obtained this way contain all the elements
of {D | C ⊏syn1 D}. Additional elements in this set are obviously strictly
subsumed by an element of {D | C ⊏syn1 D}, and thus we can remove them
by removing elements that are not subsumption minimal.
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Now, we define our new weakening relation, which syntactically general-
izes the right-hand sides of GCIs:
C ⊑ D ≻syn C ′ ⊑ D′ if C = C ′, D ⊏syn D′ and
{C ′ ⊑ D′} 6|= C ⊑ D.
The following theorem is an easy consequence of the properties of ⊏syn and
of Corollary 37.
Theorem 38. The relation ≻syn on EL axiom is a linear, complete, one-step
generated, and effectively linearly branching weakening relation.
Due to fact that ≻syn1 -steps do not increase the size of axioms, the linear
bounds on the branching of ≻syn1 and the length of ≻
syn -chains imply that
the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 19 has an exponential
search space.
Corollary 39. All maximally strong weakenings w.r.t. ≻syn of an axiom in
a justification can be computed in exponential time.
The following example shows that there may be exponentially many max-
imally strong weakenings w.r.t. ≻syn , and thus the exponential complexity
stated above is optimal.
Example 40. Let βi := Pi ⊓ Qi ⊑ B for i = 1, . . . , n and β := A ⊑
P1 ⊓ Q1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pn ⊓ Qn. We consider the ontology O = Os ∪ Or, where
Os := {βi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Or := {β}. Then J = {β} is a justification for
the consequence α = A ⊑ B, and all axioms of the form A ⊑ X1⊓X2⊓. . .⊓Xn
with Xi ∈ {Pi, Qi} are maximally strong weakenings w.r.t. ≻
syn of β in J .
The same is true for ≻sub since in the absence of roles, these two weakening
relations coincide.
A single maximally strong weakening can however be computed in poly-
nomial time.
Proposition 41. A single maximally strong weakening w.r.t. ≻syn can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The algorithm that computes a maximally strong weakening works as
follows. Starting from the concept D′ := ⊤, it looks at all possible ways of
making one step in the direction ofD using ⊐syn1 , i.e., it considers allD
′′ where
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D ⊑syn D′′ ⊏syn1 D
′. The concepts D′′ can be obtained by adding a concept
name A or an existential restriction ∃r.⊤ at a place where (the reduced
form of) D has such a concept or restriction. Obviously, there are only
polynomially many such concepts D′′. For each of them we check whether
Os ∪ (J \ {C ⊑ D}) ∪ {C ⊑ D
′′} |= α.
If this is the case for all D′′, we return C ⊑ D′. Otherwise, we choose an
arbitrary D′′ with Os ∪ (J \ {C ⊑ D}) ∪ {C ⊑ D
′′} 6|= α, and continue with
D′ := D′′.
This algorithm terminates after linearly many iterations since in each
iteration the size of D′ is increased and it cannot get larger than D. In
addition, C ⊑ D′ is maximally strong since for every axiom C ⊑ E such
that C ⊑ D ≻syn C ⊑ E ≻syn C ⊑ D′ there is a sequence E ⊏syn1 . . . ⊏
syn
1
D′′ ⊏
syn
1 D
′. Consequently, C ⊑ D′′ has the consequence, and thus also
C ⊑ E.
Nevertheless, we can show that deciding whether an axiom is a maximally
strong weakening w.r.t. ≻syn is coNP-complete.
Proposition 42. The problem of deciding whether a given EL GCI C ⊑ D′
is a maximally strong weakening of the EL GCI C ⊑ D w.r.t. ≻syn is coNP-
complete.
Proof. First, we show the coNP upper bound. Let O = Os ∪Or, J ⊆ Or a
justification of the consequence α, C ⊑ D an element of J , and C ⊑ D′ a GCI.
Obviously, we can decide in polynomial time whether C ⊑ D ≻syn C ⊑ D′
and whether Os∪(J \{C ⊑ D})∪{C ⊑ D
′} 6|= α. To disprove that C ⊑ D′ is
maximally strong, we guess an EL concept D′′ such that D ⊏syn D′′ ⊏syn D′.
This requires only polynomially many guesses: in fact, D′ is obtained from
D by replacing linearly many occurrences of subconcepts with ⊤, and we
simply guess which of these replacements are not done when going from D
to D′′. We then check in polynomial time whether C ⊑ D′′ satisfies
• Os ∪ (J \ {C ⊑ D}) ∪ {C ⊑ D
′′} 6|= α, and
• {C ⊑ D′} 6|= C ⊑ D′′.
If both tests succeed then C ⊑ D′′ is a counterexample to C ⊑ D′ being
maximally strong.
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For the hardness proof, we use again the all-maximal-valuations problem.
Given an instance ϕ,V of the all-maximal-valuations problem, we construct
an instance of our problem as follows. For every subformula ψ of ϕ, we
introduce a new concept name Bψ. If ψ is not a propositional variable, we
define the TBox:
Tψ :=
{
{Bψ1 ⊓Bψ2 ⊑ Bψ} ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2
{Bψ1 ⊑ Bψ, Bψ2 ⊑ Bψ} ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
Let V be the set of all propositional variables appearing in ϕ, and let csub(ϕ)
be the set of all subformulas of ϕ that are not in V . Define the concept
XV :=
l
W∈V
∃r.
l
{Bp | p ∈ W}.
We construct the ontology that has only one refutable axiom
XV ⊑ ∃r.
l
{Bp | p ∈ V },
and as static part the ontology
Ts =
⋃
ψ∈csub(ϕ)
Tψ ∪ {∃r.Bϕ ⊑ C}
Clearly, the refutable axiom is the only justification for XV ⊑ C.
For every valuation W ⊆ V , if W is a subset of some valuation in V, then
XV ⊑ ∃r.
l
{Bp | p ∈ W} is equivalent to XV ⊑ ⊤.
We claim that XV ⊑ ⊤ is a maximally strong weakening w.r.t. ≻
syn of the
only refutable axiom iff V is the set of all maximal valuations not satisfying
ϕ.
To prove this claim, first assume that V is not the set of all maximal
valuations not satisfying ϕ, i.e., there is a maximal valuationW not satisfying
ϕ such that W 6∈ V. On the one hand, this implies that W is incomparable
w.r.t. inclusion with any of the elements of V, and thus XV ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈
W} is not a tautology. On the other hand, we have
Ts ∪ {XV ⊑ ∃r.
l
{Bp | p ∈ W}} 6|= XV ⊑ C,
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and XV ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V } ≻
syn XV ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ W}. This shows
that the tautology XV ⊑ ⊤ is not a maximally strong weakening w.r.t. ≻
syn
of the only refutable axiom XV ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V }.
Conversely, assume that V is the set of all maximal valuations not sat-
isfying ϕ, and that γ is a maximally strong weakening w.r.t. ≻syn of XV ⊑
∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V }. If γ = XV ⊑ ⊤, then we are done. Otherwise, there is
a set W ⊆ V such that γ = XV ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ W}. But then Ts ∪ {γ} 6|=
XV ⊑ C implies that W does not satisfy ϕ, and thus W is a subset of
some valuation in V. Consequently, γ is a tautology and thus equivalent to
XV ⊑ ⊤. This shows that XV ⊑ ⊤ is a maximally strong weakening w.r.t.
≻syn of XV ⊑ ∃r.
d
{Bp | p ∈ V }.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced a framework for repairing DL-based ontologies that is
based on weakening axioms rather than deleting them, and have shown how
to instantiate this framework for the DL EL using appropriate weakening re-
lations. More precisely, we have introduced weakening relations of decreasing
strength ≻g ⊃ ≻s ⊃ ≻
sub ⊃ ≻syn , and have shown that ≻g and ≻s do not
satisfy the properties required to apply our gentle weakening approach. In
contrast, both ≻sub and ≻syn satisfy these properties, but from a complexity
point of view ≻syn is to be preferred.
Computing maximally strong weakenings w.r.t. ≻sub or ≻syn using the
algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 19 is akin to the black-box
approach for computing justifications. It would be interesting to see whether
a glass-box approach that modifies an EL reasoning procedure can also be
used for this purpose, similar to the way a tableau-based algorithms for ALC
was modified in [16]. This should be possible for ≻syn , whereas handling
≻sub with a glass-box approach is probably more challenging, but might
yield better complexity upper bounds than the generic approach based on
Proposition 19.
Our weakening relations can also be used in the setting where the ontology
is first modified, and then repaired using the classical approach as in [11]. In
fact, for effectively finitely branching and well-founded weakening relations
such as ≻sub and ≻syn , we can add for each axiom all (or some of) its finitely
many weakenings w.r.t. the given relation, and then apply the classical repair
approach. In contrast to the gentle repair approach proposed in this paper,
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a single axiom could then be replaced by several axioms, which might blow
up the size of the ontology.
In order to apply our gently repair approach in practice, one can either
compute all maximally strong weakening, and let the user choose between
them, which should be viable at least for ≻syn . Alternatively, one can try to
find heuristics for obtaining weakening oracles that compute “good” weaken-
ings or involve the user in the decisions made in each weakening step.
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